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## REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

VOLUME V - FRENCH  
COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLES:  
INDOCHINA AND ALGERIA

DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY ART AND ENGINEERING

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UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY  
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REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

VOLUME V

FRENCH COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY  
STRUGGLES: INDOCHINA AND ALGERIA

edited by  
Major J. W. Woodmansee, Jr.

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CONTENTS

Chapter One

INDOCHINA (1946-54)  
by Bernard B. Fall ..... 1

Chapter Two

OPERATIONS IN NORTH VIETNAM, 1950-1952  
by Bernard B. Fall ..... 35

Chapter Three

VO NGUYEN GIAP: VICTORY FOR THE PEOPLE'S ARMY  
edited by MAJ J.W. Woodmansee, Jr. .... 65

Chapter Four

ALGERIA (1956-62)  
by MAJ J.W. Woodmansee, Jr. .... 97

## LIST OF MAPS

	<u>Page</u>
The Battle of Vinh-Yen.....	41
The Defense of Mao-Khe.....	45
The Battle of the Day River.....	48
The "Hell of Hoa-Binh".....	53
Death at Tu-Vu.....	54
Failure at Xom-Phéo.....	58
FLN Organization (Algeria).....	104
General Map of South East Asia (Map #1).....	Inside back cover
Indochina - Tonkin, 1951 (Map #2).....	" " "
Winter '53 - Spring '54 Campaign (Map #3).....	" " "
Dien Bien Phu (Map #4).....	" " "
General Map of Northern Algeria (Map #5).....	" " "

## Chapter One

### INDOCHINA (1946-1954)

by Bernard B. Fall

This chapter is a condensation of the late Dr. Fall's study written as a part of the three volume series, Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict. The series was compiled for the Department of the Army by The Center for Research in Social Systems (CRESS) of the American University.

## INDOCHINA (1946-1954)

by Bernard B. Fall

The French in Indochina--their control weakened by wartime concessions that strengthened Vietnamese nationalism--were unable either to meet the post-war political threat of a capable, determined Communist leadership that perfectly exploited the indigenous desire for independence, or to defeat the revolutionary forces in the field.

### BACKGROUND

(See Map #1) The French colonial territory of Indochina, consisting of the present countries of Cambodia, Laos, and the two Viet-Nams, comprised 284,800 square miles and was slightly larger than the State of Texas. Its location in the monsoon zone of southeast Asia determined to a great extent the technique of the insurgency that broke out there and the eventual military outcome.

The climate of the area accounts for its tropical vegetation, which extends from the southernmost tip to slightly north of Hanoi, with normal variations for altitude and latitude. In the north, rubber trees do not flourish; in the south, European-type vegetables may be grown, but only where high altitudes permit. Almost 50 percent of the vegetal cover of the area is high-stand jungle, and another 35 percent is bush or 6-foot-high elephant grass.

The remainder of the area is lowland rice paddy, swampy for six or more months of the year.

Geographically, the Indochinese area consists of the coastal deltas of the Red River, the Mekong, and central Vietnamese rivers; the valleys of the Red River and the Mekong, and their tributaries; the Annamite mountain range and its various plateau outcroppings, which form much of the boundary between Laos, Viet-Nam, and Cambodia; and the Thai highlands, which cover most of northern Indochina. There are no natural east-west communication routes: Viet-Nam is oriented toward the coast; Laos and Cambodia toward the Mekong valley.

Of the 36 million people living in Indochina in 1954, probably fewer than 4 million lived in the vast highlands which make up more than 75 percent of the country's territory. These uplanders, mainly montagnards, were first of all hunters and only secondarily growers of crops. Many were seminomadic. About 90 percent of all Cambodians, Laotians, and Vietnamese lived at altitudes under 1,000 feet, where the principal occupation was the growing of irrigated rice.

The economic structure of French Indochina was typically colonial, geared to provide raw materials for the home country and a market for France's manufactured goods. Indochina was amply qualified for the former role, but it failed in the latter. Throughout most of the colonial period, Indochina exported far more to France than it bought, and France was never its exclusive source of finished products. France's attempt to maintain Indochina almost exclusively as a source of raw materials led to a distortion of the economic process and had an obvious influence on the country's socioeconomic structure.<sup>1</sup>

The failure to create local industries until very late in the colonial period, including the failure to realize that greater colonial purchasing power would in itself increase imports, left Indochina at the mercy of commercial monopolies which supplied the Indochinese economy with imported goods at prices far above the world market. The colony was deprived of many essential goods when normal trade currents were interrupted during World War II.

The key factor leading to the 1946 insurgency in Indochina was political in nature and derived from the imposition of an alien colonial regime upon a highly nationalistic and resistant population. The colonial federation of French Indochina comprised the protectorates of Cambodia and Laos, which France had governed since 1863 and 1893 respectively, and the three Vietnamese territories of Cochin-China, annexed by France in 1862, and Annam and Tonkin, which the French had ruled as protectorates since the 1880's. Cochin-China, comprising the Mekong Delta and Saigon region of the present South Viet-Nam, was the area of greatest French penetration and influence. Most of the 40,000 French settlers in Indochina at the beginning of World War II were concentrated in Cochin-China.

French political control was absolute, and there was little, if any, attempt to include local elites in shaping the destiny of Indochina. The titular sovereigns of Cambodia, Luang-Prabang (Laos), and Annam retained some importance in the cultural ceremonial of their countries, but they were summarily removed when they sought to gain actual control of any part of the administrative machinery. There existed, for all to see, the glaring difference between the political roles of the French minority and the vast Asian majority.

Inside Indochina, indigenous parties, both Communist and non-Communist, operated-- sometimes openly, but clandestinely when necessary. The non-Communist nationalist parties were made up chiefly of Confucian mandarins<sup>\*</sup> or other upperclass groups, and so were hard put to develop a mass base. In many cases, they did not even look for one, but rather preferred to use the conspiratorial approach familiar to them from Chinese-type secret societies.

The only indigenous political group in Indochina which made a deliberate and concentrated effort at gaining a mass base was the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), created in 1930. It had both the outside organizational support (from the U. S. S. R., France, and China) and the ability in terms of trained cadres to create a nationwide movement. The ICP was always predominantly Vietnamese in composition and leadership, although Cambodians and Laotians were included in the membership.<sup>2</sup>

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\* Vietnamese mandarins were civil servants schooled in the Chinese classics and Vietnamese traditionalism, who served in the imperial bureaucracy or local administration.

The ICP at first made grievous mistakes. Its leaders were repeatedly depleted by the French Surete in Indochina--probably one of the most efficient political police forces of its time. But the party also learned from its errors, and patiently rebuilt its organizational structure, trained its personnel, and went on with its work. The core of the present-day leadership of Vietnamese communism still dates from that difficult period in the 1930's.<sup>3</sup>

#### World War II And The Evolution of the Viet-Minh

World War II (1939-45) shattered the image of French authority in Indochina and destroyed the substance of European colonial rule over the country. The German defeat of France in June 1940 and the ensuing armistice between Germany and the pro-Axis Vichy French regime opened Indochina to Japanese penetration and exploitation. On September 22, 1940, Japanese forces, after crushing local French forces at the Chinese-Tonkin border, landed at Haiphong and proceeded to occupy strategic points throughout the country.

Indochina was thus firmly in the Japanese sphere long before the Pacific war began, although France remained the nominal sovereign of the territory and French colonial administrators remained at their posts. The Japanese were chiefly interested in the economic resources of Indochina and did not want to undertake direct administration at this time. Admiral Jean Decoux, the Vichy Governor-General of Indochina, cooperated with the Japanese since the international situation seemed to offer him no other alternative, in the hope that French authority could eventually be fully restored.

This ambiguous period of Franco-Japanese "cooperation" lasted until March 9, 1945, when the Japanese arrested all French officials and civilians in the country and destroyed all the French military forces except those able to fight their way north to Allied lines in China or to hold out in the wilds of Laos.<sup>4</sup>

The Japanese now moved to replace the French. In a gesture toward Vietnamese nationalism, they installed the Emperor Bao Dai, traditional ruler at Hue in Annam (central Viet-Nam), as head of an "independent" Vietnamese state comprising Annam and Tonkin in

the north. The Japanese, however, continued French policy with regard to Cochin-China, the third integral and most prosperous part of Viet-Nam, administering it directly as a colony. In the last days of the war, the Japanese acceded to Vietnamese demands and allowed Cochin-China to join Bao Dai's kingdom. Thus in August 1945, Viet-Nam regained its precolonial, 1858 boundaries.<sup>5</sup>

Most of the leaders of the ICP had fled to China when the 1940 uprisings were crushed, and in May 1941 they had organized, under Chinese auspices, a Communist front called the Viet-Nam Doc-Lap Dong-Minh Hoi (Vietnamese Revolutionary Independence League), or Viet Minh. With more than a decade of experience in underground organization and quasi-legal political activity, the ICP stood ready to take full advantage of the World War II situation. By late 1943, Viet Minh guerrillas and underground agents were operating in Tonkin, and on December 22, 1944, the Vietnamese Communist and nationalist leader Vo Nguyen Giap created the first unit of the Viet-Nam People's Army (VPA). When the Japanese dissolution of French colonial forces early in 1945 deprived the Allies of an intelligence apparatus inside Indochina, American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) teams were parachuted in to work with the Viet Minh, and British Force 136 began operations in support of resistance groups in the south. Viet Minh guerrillas consistently avoided any massive contact with Japanese forces, however, preferring not to grapple with an enemy who was bound to be soon leaving as the fortunes of war turned against it, and devoted this time to perfecting the Communist political control network throughout the countryside.<sup>6</sup>

#### Viet-Minh Fill Post-War Political Vacuum in the North

On August 14, 1945, Japan surrendered to the Allied Forces. According to Allied agreements, the surrender of Japanese troops in Indochina was to be effected by British and Chinese occupation forces, with the 16th parallel serving as the dividing line between the two occupation zones. Before the Allies could arrive, however, the Viet Minh proclaimed Vietnamese independence from France and set up a Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam (DRVN) in

Hanoi. In Tonkin and northern Annam the DRVN actually functioned as a de facto government for more than a year after the war ended.

In the south, where the Viet Minh was weaker and where British occupation forces had promptly released imprisoned French forces, the DRVN was unable to gain a solid foothold. Quickly driven out of Saigon and other administrative centers south of the 16th parallel by the French, the Viet Minh could operate only a "shadow government" in the south.

### French Return to Indochina

The French, firmly established in the south, found it expedient to negotiate with the DRVN regime in the north, since they considered it less dangerous to long-term French interests than the Chinese Nationalists, whom they suspected of attempting to install a puppet regime of pro-Chinese Vietnamese nationalists. The agreement of March 6, 1946, whereby the French returned to the north, recognized the DRVN as a "Free State" within the Indochinese Federation and the French Union, with its own national assembly, its own armed forces, and its own finances. Cochinchina was to decide by plebiscite whether or not to join the Hanoi-based DRVN. This agreement further added to the prestige of the Hanoi regime, and as the Chinese withdrew from Indochina on March 6, the Viet Minh was solidly entrenched and a form of dual government then prevailed in Vietnamese territory. Thus, the Communists had won their first major victory in Indochina almost without firing a shot.

Differences between French and Viet Minh forces soon developed, however. The French proceeded to set up a separate administration for the central Vietnamese highlands. Their authorities in Saigon encouraged the establishment of an "Autonomous Republic" in Cochinchina, despite their earlier commitment to a plebiscite. Lack of coordination and control by French authorities in Paris over their forces in Indochina was a major factor in the deterioration of Franco-Vietnamese relations.

Negotiations dragged on throughout the summer of 1946. Ho Chi Minh, President of the DRVN and the leading exponent of Vietnamese independence, as well as the founding father

of the Indochinese Communist movement, headed the Vietnamese delegation sent to France to negotiate for recognition of a unified and independent Viet-Nam under DRVN control. By September, the Fontainebleau Conference had ended inconclusively and the Vietnamese leaders returned to Hanoi to prepare for action of a different sort. Relations between French and DRVN officials went from bad to worse. In November, shooting broke out in Haiphong, and the French responded by bombarding the city, killing several thousand Vietnamese. The DRVN reacted to the Haiphong incident by attacking French garrisons on December 19, 1946, and the military phase of the revolution had begun.<sup>7</sup>

## INSURGENCY

Although the military phase of the insurgency did not begin until the end of 1946, its political phase had begun well before the end of World War II. Through propaganda and indoctrination efforts begun in 1943, the Viet Minh had gained political control of many villages in Tonkin, particularly along the Chinese border. In August 1945, the Viet Minh had another political success. Emperor Bao Dai, whom the Japanese had installed a few months earlier as head of an "independent" Vietnamese state, decided to abdicate in favor of the Viet Minh, which this weak but pronationalist monarch believed to be a genuine nationalist movement. On August 25, Bao Dai had handed over the imperial seal and other symbols of authority to Ho Chi Minh, thus conferring a semblance of legitimacy, particularly in terms of Vietnamese tradition, on the DRVN regime, formally proclaimed by the Viet Minh on September 2, 1945. On that day, Ho Chi Minh began his address to the crowds in words well-known to another people: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal. . . ." It was from the Japanese, Ho stated, that independence had been won, because "since the autumn of 1940, our country ceased to be a French colony. . . ."<sup>8</sup>

### Viet-Minh Military Organization

On the military side, the Viet-Nam People's Army (VPA) at first copied the French

quaternary organization: 2, 500-man regiments of four battalions, including a heavy weapons or artillery unit. By 1949, 5, 000-man brigades appeared, and by late 1950, 10, 000-man ternary divisions. Later a Russian-model "heavy division" appeared, with two field artillery regiments, one combat engineer regiment, an antiaircraft battalion, and the usual service units.

In terms of mission, three echelons made their appearance in the VPA by 1947; the first-line regulars, or main force (chu-luc); the regional units (dia-phuong quan); and the local militia (du-kich). Of these, only the chu-luc was fully mobile, being likely to show up in combat anywhere from the Chinese border to northern Cambodia. With almost no exceptions, the men covered these vast distances on foot, carrying full battle kit. The Viet Minh forces consistently outpaced French estimates of their mobility; jungle dashes of 25 miles a day for several consecutive days were not unknown. Viet Minh regulars were sparingly used and were reserved for battles of strategic importance; but when the target was worthwhile--as, for example, the liquidation of French forces on the Chinese border in 1950, or the attempted capture of Hanoi in 1951, or the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954--they were fully committed regardless of casualties. Although two regiments of regulars were infiltrated inside the Red River Delta and its "Marshal de Lattre" fortified line of 2, 200 bunkers, most small attacks were carried out by the regionals. The local militia was used chiefly in reconnaissance for larger units unfamiliar with the terrain, or in covering the withdrawal of such units; it also played an important role in gathering local intelligence and in preparing ambushes and in sabotage.

The DRVN saw to it that its units were ethnically homogeneous, at least at regimental level. Thus the 308th Division was known as the "capital division" because of its Hanoi recruitment, while the 316th was largely of Tho tribal origin and the 335th of Thai tribal origin. Regiment 120 was Hre, and 803 Jarai. In this way, a unit could be fairly sure of being well received and perfectly at home in at least one area.

The insurgents' military effort was ably assisted by a psychological warfare and intelligence operation of major proportions. Special Viet Minh teams and units known as dich-van (translated as "moral intervention," or more realistically "armed propaganda") were used to penetrate villages and French posts in order to gather intelligence and prepare the way for insurgent attack. There were also dich-van teams in charge of assassinating officials who refused to collaborate with the Viet Minh. The most notable such coup was the simultaneous murder in August 1951 of French General Chanson and South Vietnamese Regional Governor Thai Lap Thanh by a "suicide volunteer" boobytrapped with hand grenades.

Communist forces started with a strength of about 60,000 men in 1946 and ended the insurgency with close to 380,000 men, of whom fewer than 120,000 were regulars. Their total casualties will no doubt be forever unknown, since it is impossible to tell a dead peasant from a dead guerrilla and since the Viet Minh made a habit of carrying off casualties, precisely to prevent their being correctly estimated. But such battles as that of Vinh-Yen in 1951 cost the Viet Minh 6,000 casualties and that of Dien Bien Phu 22,000; total casualties were beyond a doubt not far from 500,000, or about three times those of the French Union Forces.<sup>9</sup>

Although guided by leaders who had learned their job in French, Chinese Nationalist, and Chinese Communist schools, the VPA sometimes made grievous mistakes, such as the three abortive offensives in 1951 against the French-held Red River Delta, but they always corrected these with alacrity. The Communist method of "self-criticism" and "comradely criticism" of others may have contributed to the VPA's efficiency. The VPA proved to be a great deal more flexible tactically and strategically than has been generally believed. The decision to revert to low-level attacks when big-unit operations failed may have been the critical decision of the Viet Minh campaign.

The commander in chief of the VPA was Vo Nguyen Giap. Son of a poor scholar, Giap was educated at the Lycee National in Hue, the traditional capital. Involved in various

nationalist movements in the 1920's and early 1930's, he joined the ICP about 1937. Until 1940, he was a history professor in Hanoi. He is said to have never forgiven the French for the death of his wife in a French prison in 1943. Ho Chi Minh put him in charge of training a guerrilla force during World War II, and by the end of the war, Giap was second only to Ho Chi Minh in the Communist movement in Indochina. A great admirer of Mao Tse-tung, he took over Mao's concepts of revolutionary warfare tactics, adapting them wherever necessary.<sup>10</sup>

### Five Phases of Viet-Minh Operations

The Viet Minh's combat operations against the French fell into five major phases. The first of these was "beachhead elimination," the ill-fated attempt at throwing the French into the sea before they could get a solid foothold in Viet-Nam (December 1946-March 1947). Next came a period of "containment and consolidation," after the collapse of talks with the French in March 1947, when the Viet Minh finally realized it must expect a protracted conflict and must, accordingly, create some relatively secure bases and, if possible, establish permanent contact with a sanctuary. In several limited offensives, the Viet Minh cleared a redoubt in northwestern Tonkin, crushed the French border positions, and thus established permanent contact with Red China. It could train and equip its regulars there by the time this phase ended in October 1950.

The third phase, later termed the "erroneous general counter-offensive," followed next, with multidivision attacks against French lowland positions in the spring of 1951. It failed when French air-transported reinforcements and U.S. equipment were used to break up massed Viet Minh attacks in the Red River Delta zone. [This phase will be covered in more detail in the next chapter.] An insufficiently-prepared attack against the Thai highlands, after initial success, also failed, when attempts at storming the French airborne stronghold at Na San met defeat, with heavy Viet Minh casualties. On the other hand, two deep stabs by the French at Hoa-Binh and Phu-Doan enabled the Viet Minh to study in detail the weak-

nesses of French motorized forces in the face of guerrilla-type, hit-and-run attacks.

The Viet Minh next began a fourth or "strategic defensive" phase with small but effective stabs deep into French-held areas. This included offensives into northern Laos in the winter of 1953 and into southern Laos and the southern plateau in the spring of 1954. These operations were meant to deplete French reserves and strain their logistical system, while building up the insurgents' regular forces for their fifth and final phase of "general counteroffensive," a series of brief but brutal large-scale attacks made for the purpose of destroying a maximum of French troops. Dien Bien Phu and the battle for the Red River Delta were highlights of this period, which ended when French and Vietnamese forces signed a cease-fire agreement at Geneva, on July 20, 1954. [These last two phases will be covered in detail in Chapter Three of this text.]

#### External Support Vital To Communist Victory

There can be no doubt that external aid was crucial to the insurgents' eventual success. The aid given in 1945-46 to DRVN forces by Chinese Nationalists, Japanese deserters, and even American OSS teams and the Combat Section, South China Command, under Brig. Gen. Philip E. Gallagher, was crucial in the early days. In addition, until late 1947, there was a steady flow of U. S. equipment smuggled in by private aircraft and vessels from the Philippines, in exchange for gold and opium. These craft were finally attacked without warning by the French and destroyed, thus ending this source of Viet Minh supply.<sup>11</sup> There is no way of estimating the size or kind of equipment which reached the Viet Minh from such miscellaneous sources.

Foreign aid to the Viet Minh began to play a really effective role only after 1950, when Red Chinese deliveries permitted the equipment of a first wave of 26 battalions. The bulk of these forces was trained in Red China at Chiang-Hsi (Kwangsi Province). Red Chinese aid, coming by known routes, could be fairly closely estimated. French intelligence sources stated that about 75 percent of Chinese aid consisted of fuel and ammunition, 25

percent of weapons and other equipment. Deliveries went from 10-20 tons a month in 1951 to 250 tons a month by the end of 1952, to 400-600 tons a month in 1953, and to a peak of 1,500-4,000 tons a month between January and June 1954.<sup>12</sup>

Soviet bloc and French Communist aid to the Viet Minh was important in both the economic and political fields. In 1950, almost 40 percent of the vehicles sent to French forces in Indochina from France were sabotaged, and even equipment delivered from American west coast ports was not exempt from Communist tampering. Funds for the Viet Minh were collected in most Soviet satellites and by French Communists. For propaganda purposes, the U. S. S. R. repatriated captured German members of the French Foreign Legion to East Berlin; Czechoslovakia mailed letters and propaganda newspapers from French prisoners of war to their families in France. The insurgents were also aided by neutral India's policy of forbidding the overflight of her territory by French transport aircraft. All of these activities helped the insurgents, particularly the last, which affected indirectly the cause of the battle of Dien Bien Phu.

#### COUNTERINSURGENCY

Even before the general outbreak of armed insurgency in late 1946 there was already a deep split between France's military and civilian leadership in Indochina concerning the Vietnamese situation. For the most part, the French underestimated the seriousness of the Viet Minh challenge and failed to understand the depth and intensity of Vietnamese nationalist sentiment. Gen. Philippe Leclerc, the commander of French forces in Indochina from October 1945 to July 1946, realized that the returning French were up against a popular movement which would be difficult to defeat militarily, and he was also keenly aware of the numerical weakness of French forces in the country. On the other hand, Admiral d'Argenlieu, France's civilian High Commissioner to Indochina stationed in Saigon and a firm believer in tough colonial policies, discounted the seriousness of the situation.

Backed by the old-line "Indochina hands" of the colonial civil service in Saigon, d'Argenlieu's views prevailed over those of Leclerc.

The mission of Leclerc's French Expeditionary Corps (FEC)\* was thus regarded simply as one of "pacification," to be conducted along the classic lines of France's earlier colonial wars. What actually occurred was a series of flag marches through Viet Minh territory, with columns of tanks and personnel carriers moving rapidly from town to town but never meeting the enemy head-on and with no plans--or military capability--for occupation in depth. Within a few months, much of what the French still regarded as Cochin-China was once more under French control--to the extent of about 100 yards on either side of all major roads. The lack of Vietnamese resistance in the face of French armored columns was interpreted as a sign of submission, and the Viet Minh's continued killing of local officials was believed to be merely a sign of temporary lawlessness in the countryside.<sup>13</sup>

However, when negotiations at Fontainebleau broke down and tension between French and DRVN forces in the north began mounting in the fall of 1946, incidents increased and the true dimensions of the Viet Minh problem in the countryside became apparent.

#### Initial French Actions

The FEC then had at its disposal one infantry division at full strength and an armored combat command, two parachute battalions, and about three Spitfire fighter squadrons. Miscellaneous French units reconstituted from prisoners of war liberated from Japanese concentration camps accounted for about three regiments, some of which contained indigenous troops. The total number of troops available in Indochina at the beginning of 1947 was about 40,000; by the end of that year there were some 70,000. Only the paratroops, two companies of which had liberated all of Laos in a series of lightning raids, could be considered suitable for counterinsurgency operations in the jungle. The remainder

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\*Corps Expeditionnaire Francais Extreme-Orient (CEFEO).

were useful only for conventional warfare.

What gave the appearance of at least limited French success in the first sequence of events was the fact that the Viet Minh had tried to defend fixed objectives, most of which the French took without great difficulty. The French appeared to be stymied chiefly by their lack of troops and supplies.<sup>14</sup> In 1947, the FEC began large pincer operations, some of which, such as Operation LEA, involved 20,000 troops of all services. These were designed to capture or destroy the bulk of the Viet Minh's regular troops and the DRVN governmental apparatus then in hiding around Tuyen-Quang. While the statistics on Viet Minh casualties lent each French operation the appearance of victory, none ever achieved the basic objective of destroying the enemy's means of maintaining political and military resistance.

For the French, the Indochina War became an unending search for the "set-piece battle." Slowly, French tactical organization went through a series of modifications to adapt itself to the terrain and the enemy it would have to fight. From divisions of the European type, the FEC in 1949 went to the equally unwieldy other extreme, with battalions that were not strong enough to withstand attack by the enemy's basic large unit, the brigade.

#### de Lattre Reorganized the Forces

In 1950, Gen. Jean de Lattre de Tassigny took over as commander in chief of the French Union Forces (FUF) [and as High Commissioner]. Imperious and commanding--known as "le roi Jean"--de Lattre set the "tone" of the theater until he left in late 1951 to die of cancer. He was posthumously awarded the rank of Field Marshal. Given to demanding all the honors of ceremony and known to have fired the area commander of Hanoi for deficiencies in his honor guard, de Lattre was also highly practical. He drafted French civilians in Indochina for guard duties and commandeered civilian aircraft in Saigon for troop transport. During battle, he once flew into a small endangered outpost and answered a subordinate commander's radioed reminder of his danger with, "Well, break through

and get me out."<sup>15</sup> In 1951, General de Lattre developed the standard unit for the Indochina war, the Groupe Mobile, a ternary regimental combat team organized to operate independently. It existed both as a mobile infantry unit (GM) and as an armored unit (GB); and late in 1952 it even appeared in an airborne (GAP) version, of which there were finally one Vietnamese and two French units, with a total of nine battalions. However, the appearance of two or three jointly-operating Viet Minh divisions compelled the French to operate in larger GM formations in 1953-54, and light divisions were in the process of being reintroduced when the war ended. There also existed four provisional Divisions de Marche in Tonkin, formed from the available GM's.

When, after 1949, in political developments to be discussed later, France gave the three Indochinese countries technical independence, it also created national armies for Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam. Some, but not all, of the indigenous troops serving with the FEC were transferred into these national armies and military schools were set up in each country to provide native officer cadres--though in insufficient numbers for these national forces. The high command of the French Union Forces controlled both the French and African regulars of the FEC and the three national Indochinese armies. This organizational structure remained in effect until after the 1954 cease-fire, except in the case of Cambodia, where the Cambodian Army High Command took full administrative control over the Royal Khmer Forces as early as October 1953. By 1954, FEC forces totaled 278,000 and national components about 200,000.

The French also used montagnard forces in the northern highlands of Laos and Viet-Nam and on the Southern Plateau of Viet-Nam. There was a regimental combat team (Groupe Mobile No. 42) made up of Bahnar and Rhade tribesmen; a 4th Vietnamese Mountain Division, created in 1951; and the famous 5th Division, made up of northern Nungs. The montagnards also provided excellent officer material, and they fought loyally on the French side to the end.

Irregular forces used by the counterinsurgents included the private armies of the

various politico-religious sects. In the south, the Hoa-Hao and Cao-Dai sects, whose religious practices are modified forms of Buddhism, had a total strength of about 4 million believers and controlled large segments of the population in the Mekong Delta and Tay-Ninh Province. Some 15,000 to 20,000 Cao-Dai troops and about 8,000 to 10,000 Hoa-Hao troops fought on the Government side.<sup>16</sup> Catholic armed units, called Unites Mobiles de Défense des Chrétientés (Christian Communities Mobile Defense Units), controlled large parts of the eastern Mekong Delta area; in the north, similar Catholic self-defense units existed in the bishoprics of Phat-Diem and Bui-Chu in the southern part of the Red River Delta. Small French liaison teams were assigned to these Buddhist and Christian forces, referred to by the French as supplétifs, but they had their own cadres and officers, many of whom were given training by the French in a special paramilitary school at Thu-Duc near Saigon. These paramilitary units were loosely coordinated by the Inspectorate for Supplementary Forces under the French Union Forces General Staff.

Examination of French combat operations in Indochina will clearly demonstrate several phases.<sup>17</sup> Until September 1950, a "constant offensive" was employed, using pincer operations designed to destroy both the guerrilla forces in the field and the insurgent administrative apparatus. After the destruction and loss of French positions along the Chinese border in 1950, the French decided to withdraw to the lowland Red River Delta and to consolidate their positions there until they were ready for further offensive operations. This phase of "retrenchment and consolidation" led to the construction of a bunker line in the Red River Delta [the "de Lattre Line"]. The fall of 1951 saw the beginning of a period of offensive stabs, such as the one around Hoa-Binh, Operation LORRAINE, and constant mopping-up operations in the Mekong and Red River Deltas. Momentum was lost when the growing aggressiveness of Viet Minh forces in the spring of 1953 led to a policy of "hedgehogs." In order to break the momentum of guerrilla attacks until sufficient Indochinese national forces became available for static defensive missions and freed the FEC for constant offensives, air-supplied hedgehog positions were created in 1953-54 at Na San, the Plain of Jars,

Muong-Sai, Séno, and Dien Bien Phu. These were designed to deflect Viet Minh attacks against vital centers.

#### Navarre Assumes Command in 1953

When Gen. Henri-Eugene Navarre took over as commander in chief of the FUF in July 1953, his instructions were to defend Laos if possible but to safeguard the French Expeditionary Corps at all costs. His plan for action called for continuation and intensification of de Lattre's tactics; the buildup of local national forces; and the infusion of new spirit, mobility, and aggressiveness in French forces. The Navarre Plan, which was to have been fully implemented by 1955 but was never put into effect in view of the French defeat, provided for freeing the FEC entirely from static defense missions. Stationed at 21 "land-air bases" set up within Viet Minh territory, troops were to carry out offensive operations that would compel the enemy to use his troops for the defense of his own rear areas.

#### French Attempt Special Warfare

One of the most interesting aspects of French counterinsurgency operations was the increasingly intensive use of long-range penetration and commando operations behind enemy lines, or rather inside enemy territory. Created by General de Lattre in 1951, the Groupements de Commandos Mixtes Aéroportés (GCMA), or Composite Airborne Commando Groups, under the command of Lt. Col. Roger Trinquier, began to fight the Viet Minh with its own tactics. The purpose of the GCMA was emphatically not to hit and run in raider fashion but to establish local contacts with the population and arouse them to resistance against the Viet Minh. When a willingness to do so had been demonstrated, the French would then parachute in additional cadres of local origin to transform a French-created activity into a purely indigenous movement.<sup>18</sup> Such work required a great deal of patience and risk-taking on the part of the initial contact teams

of perhaps four or five men, which necessarily included one or two natives from the contact area.

Trinquier asserts to this day that, had his operation been given wider latitude and more logistical support, the GCMA could have transformed the whole character of the struggle.<sup>19</sup> By July 1954, there even existed in the mountain areas of Tonkin the beginnings of a "Mountain People's Committee" calling for self-government of the northern mountain areas "liberated" by the GCMA. Over 20,000 French-sponsored guerrillas were actually operating inside Viet Minh territory by mid-1954, and plans called for 50,000 by 1955. There is no doubt that such a force would have created serious difficulties for the Viet Minh forces. As it was, the GCMA could point to the fact that their operations in the highlands kept 14 Viet Minh battalions on the lookout during the battle of Dien Bien Phu, while the 15,000 FEC troops at Dien Bien Phu tied down only 29 Viet Minh battalions. The GCMA also liberated singlehandedly all of Phong Saly Province in Laos--a feat regular forces had been unable to accomplish.

On the other hand, the GCMA failed in what should have been its primary mission: the destruction of Viet Minh supply routes to Dien Bien Phu. GCMA proponents claim, however, that the cautious approach the commandos had to use to be successfully accepted by the local population made it impossible to create an effective force in the Dien Bien Phu area in time to intervene successfully. Trinquier asserts that, after the cease-fire, he attempted to get American military authorities in Saigon to continue support of the anti-Communist guerrillas inside what was to become Communist North Viet-Nam but met with no encouragement. The anti-Communist guerrillas were destroyed by the Viet Minh after 1954.<sup>20</sup>

#### The Role of Air and Sea Power

Airpower, which was also used for reconnaissance and tactical bombing and strafing missions, provided the French with essential logistical support, often in places where

airborne reinforcements were the only kind which could get through. The French Air Force (FAF) at first used Spitfires and P-63's in ground support operations and C-47's for bombing and transport missions. In the 1950-54 period, when American B-26's and F4F's became the tactical mainstay, there was a total of 475 aircraft operating in Indochina. The primary mission of the FAF was to provide close tactical support to FUF ground forces and to transport army personnel and supplies. Airborne operations were conducted extensively during the last years of the war, although helicopters were never in active use. Some FAF officers complained of having to function in a supporting role under the command of FUF ground units, instead of being allowed to concentrate on air strikes against Viet Minh supply lines. It is not likely, however, that air attacks would have met with any great success, as the Vietnamese insurgents were particularly adept at camouflage and decentralization of logistical targets. Also, in the later state of the war, the insurgents had anti-aircraft capabilities.

If airpower proved generally disappointing except in the very important area of logistics, the French Navy's amphibious operations in Indochina made a significant contribution to the art of warfare. Since Vietnamese rivers are navigable for LCM- and LCT-type craft\* fairly far inland, the French Navy developed tactical units known as Dinassauts (naval assault divisions) equipped with some 12 to 18 craft ranging from LCVP's to LSSL's. Each Dinassaut was made up of an Opening Group (Groupement d'ouverture) of small reconnaissance craft; a Shock Group of ships carrying marine commandos and sometimes armored vehicles; a Base-of-Fire Group, composed of ship-borne heavy mortars or tank-turreted LCM's; and a Command and Support Group, which usually included the command LSSL, supply LCM's, and often the small amphibian aircraft which were part of the Dinassaut.

In addition to these purely naval units, which possessed considerable fire and shock

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\*Locally modified U.S. landing craft: LCM (Landing Craft, Materiel), LCT (Landing Craft, Tank), LCVP (Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel), LSSL (Landing Ship Support, Large), LST (Landing Ship, Tank).

power and participated in several major operations, there were other specialized amphibious units built around Crab-and Alligator-type U.S. naval craft. Each such group was composed of 33 vehicles, including artillery and mortars. Finally, the French Quartermaster Service operated several supply companies equipped with 32 LCM's each. Since each LCM had the carrying capacity of fifty 2.5-ton trucks, any operation within reach of a navigable river was normally assured of rapid and fairly safe logistical support, although there were many ambushes of such convoys by the Viet Minh. French units faced river mines and attacks by well-camouflaged snipers with recoilless rifles along the riverbanks; there were even cases of dams being built at night across a river to cut off the withdrawal of French river craft.<sup>21</sup>

#### French Lose The Political Battle

In the all-important area of political reform, the colonial power was handicapped by the total lack of consensus in France and Indochina alike as to the future of the territory and by the absence of effective indigenous leadership once a policy of decolonialization was finally embarked upon. When Bao Dai returned to lead the reunified and theoretically independent non-Communist state of Viet-Nam, there was little to excite the imagination of the Vietnamese people, and endless haggling over details among French and Indochinese officials frittered away the psychological impact of the event. The "Bao Dai solution," with its series of ineffective premiers under the inept leadership of an unpopular monarch and the continued dominance of the French High Commissioner in Saigon, failed almost from the start. The Bao Dai regime set up in 1949 was never able to offer any real challenge to the Ho Chi Minh regime.<sup>22</sup>

In the face of basic military and political failures, the various techniques of population management tried by the French had little practical effect. The country was far too vast and rebel-held areas too interwoven with loyal areas even to apply effective food-denial measures. Too much of the population was directly under Viet Minh control

to implement a thoroughgoing program of resettlement, although a limited program in Cambodia met with much success.<sup>23</sup> Police action against Viet Minh terrorists in the Saigon area was successful after 1951, however, when a brutally efficient security system was established.

### Viet-Minh Operations Disperse French Military Strength

(see Map #3) During the last six months of the Indochina conflict, French Union Forces suffered serious reverses, beginning with the Viet-Minh offensive into Laos in December 1953. In a rapid dash across northern Laos, the VPA's 308th Division reached Muong-Sai, north of Luang-Prabang, while another stab across central Laos by strong elements of the 304th and 325th VPA Divisions reached the Mekong at Thakhek by late December, cutting Laos in half and rolling back French positions all along the Mekong Valley to the Thai border.

In the meantime, the Viet Minh had also gone on the offensive in the Southern Plateau. There, VPA Regiments 108 and 803 swarmed across Roads 14 and 19, encircled Ankhé, took Kontum, and proceeded to destroy GM's 100 and 42 in a grueling campaign that was to last until the July cease-fire. This drive eventually brought VPA regulars to the southern edge of the Southern Plateau.

FUF activities during this critical period were aimed at preventing a rapid buildup of Viet-Minh forces around the vital Red River Delta in the north and at diverting VPA troops in central Viet-Nam from attacks against the Mekong Valley and the northern positions.<sup>24</sup> Operation ATLANTE, a French seaborne landing made at Tuy-Hoa in south central Viet-Nam, was therefore undertaken in the insurgents' Interzone V.<sup>25</sup> Its goal--to divert VPA troops--was, however, unsuccessful both in concept and execution. Tuy-Hoa was too far away to tempt Viet-Minh forces in the north, and in fact the Viet-Minh were not drawn away from their centers of strength. Thus the French frittered away valuable resources. In a second effort to attract northern Viet-Minh forces away from

the Red River Delta and to block their entry into northern Laos, French forces were airdropped into Dien Bien Phu, located only 230 miles northwest of the Red River Delta, on November 30, 1953; this was the start of Operation CASTOR.

#### Dien Bien Phu-Operation CASTOR

Garrisoned in a valley somewhat less than 10 miles long and 6 miles wide, with outlying defense positions on some but not all of the surrounding hills, eight battalions of FUF troops waited for almost four months before the Viet-Minh attacked in force. The two-month siege of Dien Bien Phu began in March 1954, when the VPA took up positions in the hills overlooking the French outposts and began a barrage of artillery fire which could not be countered. The 15,000 defenders soon found that they had drastically underestimated the VPA's artillery and attack capabilities. Meanwhile, the onset of the monsoon season curtailed French air operations vital in the lift of the 200 tons of supply a day required for the troops at Dien Bien Phu. Under incessant shelling and wave after wave of attacking VPA infantry, French defense perimeters were steadily reduced until finally even the air strips inside Dien Bien Phu were lost. Left without adequate air support and cut off from relief by ground forces unable to break through the iron ring of the VPA siege force, the garrison surrendered on May 8, 1954.<sup>26</sup>

The consequences of Dien Bien Phu's fall were far-reaching. Although five Viet-Minh divisions had remained concentrated in that area for almost four months, partially achieving the initial goal of deflecting VPA pressure elsewhere, the fall of the garrison was devastating in terms of loss of French combat morale and world opinion. The respite thus bought for the Red River Delta by the sacrifice of Dien Bien Phu was too short to do any good. Three VPA divisions appeared on the edge of the delta within a month after Dien Bien Phu, and by July the French perimeter around the Hanoi-Haiphong road and rail axis had shrunk to a narrow corridor. Except in southern Viet-Nam, the situation changed for the worse.

To cope with the vastly deteriorated military situation, the French needed reinforcements of supplies and personnel in large numbers. French laws, however, still forbade the use of French draftees outside of Europe. In the United States there was little opposition to supplying economic and material aid to the French, but the possibility of involving American troops in combat operations in Indochina created an immediate outcry in the U. S. Congress. France's failure to give real substance to the independence granted the Indochinese states in 1949 gave the conflict the character of a colonial war in American eyes, and besides, the memory of Korea was all too fresh. Anxious to avoid involvement in another Asian war, the United States refused even to send American planes to rescue the beleaguered French at Dien Bien Phu.<sup>27</sup>

In France, the war in Indochina became increasingly unpopular because of its financial cost, its drain on the French Regular Army, and its exploitation by the left-wing parties as a domestic political issue. Faced with mounting domestic opposition to a continuance of the war, and without any hope of active Anglo-American participation in their counterinsurgent efforts, the French Government of Prime Minister Pierre Mendès-France resolved to end the conflict by negotiations at an international conference of world powers.

#### OUTCOME AND CONCLUSIONS

Hostilities were officially ended on July 20, 1954, when a ceasefire agreement was signed at Geneva, Switzerland, by the military representatives of the FUF High Command on behalf of the FEC and the Vietnamese and Laotian Armies and by representatives of the Vietnamese People's Army High Command. The Cambodian Army High Command, operating alone since October 1953, signed on its own. Communist China, the U. S. S. R., Great Britain, and the United States were also represented. It was agreed at this conference that all Viet-Minh forces would be "regrouped" north of the 17th parallel (the present territory of North Viet-Nam) and all Laotian Communist forces in Laos were

to be withdrawn to southern Indochina. Pending eventual elections to reunify Viet-Nam, that country was to be administered by Communist forces in the north and by non-Communist forces in the south. Neither the Government of Viet-Nam (GVN) in the south--later to become the Republic of Viet-Nam--nor the United States signed the Geneva agreements, but in a separate declaration the United States promised to "refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb" these agreements and the U. S. Government stated that "it would view any renewal of the aggression. . . . with grave concern."<sup>28</sup>

The Geneva agreements of 1954, by providing the Viet-Minh with a homogeneous and openly-held territory and a Communist buffer zone in Laos, gave the DRVN an international standing which it had not previously enjoyed. Also, the transfer to Communist hands of North Vietnamese industrial centers and the prestige-laden city of Hanoi, with its modern installations and Indochina's only full-fledged university, gave the DRVN the basic infrastructure for national viability. The fact that 860,000 North Vietnamese fled to the south during the 300-day grace period for withdrawals provided in the agreements also temporarily lightened the DRVN's supply burden. North Viet-Nam, it should be remembered, is a food-deficit area. On the other hand, the Viet-Minh received less territory under the Geneva settlement--which divided Viet-Nam at the 17th parallel--than their military forces actually held at the time of the diplomatic conference. This has been explained by the conciliatory role played at Geneva by the U. S. S. R., which in 1954 was trying to induce France not to join the European Defense Community.

The effect of the cease-fire on South Viet-Nam was in some ways beneficial. It brought a temporary halt to open Communist activity, cleared the way for the total withdrawal of the colonial presence of France, made possible large-scale aid by the United States, and provided the breathing space necessary for the creation of a more stable system of civilian government in the form of the Republic of Viet-Nam, proclaimed on October 26, 1955. Until late in 1959, Communist insurgency was limited to the fringe areas of Laos and to small-scale activities in South Viet-Nam, where its

apparently non-military nature (e. g., the assassination of village officials) was mistakenly interpreted as the "dying gasps" of the earlier Indochina war rather than the resumption of new hostilities.<sup>28</sup>

For France, the Geneva accord provided an exit--albeit a humiliating one--from a military and political cul-de-sac whose expense in both treasure and manpower was beyond endurance. Despite increasing American aid, which by 1954 was expected to reach 70 percent of the current war costs, the Indochina war was damaging the French economy, its total cost estimated to have been over \$11 billion. The conflict also distorted the structure of the French military establishment, whose best troops were involved 8,000 miles from home.<sup>29</sup>

Total casualties in the French Expeditionary Corps during the eight years of fighting amounted to 140,000, and there were some 31,000 casualties in the Indochinese national armies. Although there was no deliberate policy to kill wounded prisoners of war, no special facilities were provided for their care by the Communists before 1954. No prisoners with abdominal, chest, or skull wounds are known to have survived.<sup>30</sup>

From a military viewpoint, the French Army gained from its Indochinese experience a valuable store of first-hand knowledge about counterinsurgency warfare operations which was later to prove useful in Algeria.

### Lessons Learned

What were the lessons of the Indochina conflict? French forces in Indochina were highly organized and well-equipped for conventional combat operations, at least after 1946. The very sophistication and complexity of the French military establishment, however, deprived it of one essential characteristic of successful counterinsurgency--speed in reacting to new situations. What is meant here is not speed of movement across terrain, so much as "administrative speed," or the time required to relay valuable information and to get back the proper orders in response. In that sense, the French

never gained the initiative. Although it has been widely accepted that French counter-insurgency operations in Indochina were entirely of the Maginot Line variety, the facts fail to bear out that view. Until 1949, the very size of the FEC precluded its resort to any such attempt at holding a battleline; instead the FEC practiced another well-known French concept of war which proved to be almost as costly as Maginot Line tactics might have been -- the constant offense tactic.

A major lesson of the Indochinese conflict is that the indigenous peoples of Southeast Asia fight well when properly motivated and led. Among the animistic mountain tribes of Viet-Nam, military prowess has as high a value as among American plains Indians. The lowland Indochinese have made good highland jungle fighters, disproving the myth that lowlanders fight well only in a rice-paddy environment.

Above all, what accounted for the eventual French defeat was simply the fact that the French were fighting at almost a 1-to-1 ratio, a type of war in which a 10-to-1 superiority on the part of the counterinsurgent force is generally considered minimal for success.<sup>31</sup> The real surprise of the French counterinsurgency effort in Indochina is not that the French were defeated, but that it took eight years for this to happen.

The chief political mistake of the French colonial regime in Indochina was its failure to encourage moderate elements to form local mass-based political parties. Thus, non-Communist nationalists were forced to choose either abject submission as French puppets or active participation in the Communist-dominated Viet-Minh.

One remarkable thing about the Communist organization in Indochina was that the ICP dominated the national movement -- the only Communist party in southeast Asia to do so. Even in Indonesia, where Dutch colonial policies certainly did not favor the moderates, the Communists had been unable to control the nationalist movement. Communist success in Indochina was as much due to the sophistication of Vietnamese Communist leadership as to the nature of French colonial policies, although these two factors complemented each other. What sets off the ICP from other Communist organizations almost the world over is that, long before Tito and others in eastern Europe discovered "national communism,"

the Indochinese Communists had achieved a complete symbiosis of their doctrinal and national objectives. In fact, it can be shown that their nationalist anti-French resistance was not at first greeted with enthusiasm on the part of either the French or Soviet Communist Parties.<sup>32</sup> But it completely fooled those non-Communist observers who saw only the ICP's primarily "nationalist" behavior and not its ultimate "Communist" objectives.

When hostilities began in Viet-Nam in late 1946, the French had only two real choices. They could turn Viet-Nam over without a fight to the DRVN regime, in which the Communists were already the dominant political group and the controlling force, or they could fight. Twice during the Indochina war a negotiated peace might have been obtained. The first time was in March 1947, when Professor Paul Mus, the French negotiator, had almost come to full agreement with Ho Chi Minh; but the French high command insisted upon the return to French authority of all "war criminals and deserters," such as foreign instructors, mainly Japanese and German, who were serving with the Viet-Minh. The second chance came after Giap's "erroneous offensives" of the 1951-52 period had brought the Viet-Minh to grief. A French delegation was about to meet with DRVN representatives in Rangoon when it received orders to return to France, allegedly as a result of American pressure,<sup>33</sup> since an end of the war in Indochina at that time would have thrown the entire weight of Communist aggression in Asia upon the Korean front. On the whole, however, the French maintained an unrealistic policy of unconditional surrender almost until the end of the insurgency. It was only when military victory appeared completely impossible that the French accepted an alternative solution giving the Communists something less than full control of Viet-Nam, key to the entire Indochinese territory.

Admitting that the Indochina struggle was first and foremost a colonial war and that France's motives for fighting it were not strictly altruistic, it should nevertheless be noted that the outcome of the conflict bought at least five years of freedom from

Communist takeover for some 23 out of about 38 million people. Considering the alternative possibility, the results of the French counterinsurgency in Indochina do not appear to have been wholly negative.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams (rev. ed.; New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 29-31.

<sup>2</sup>For a good appraisal of ICP operations in the 1930's, see I. Milton Sacks, "Marxism in Viet-Nam," Marxism in Southeast Asia, ed. Frank Trager (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960).

<sup>3</sup>Cf. Truong Chinh, Primer for Revolt (New York: Praeger, 1963).

<sup>4</sup>Fall, Two Viet-Nams, pp. 40-59.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 60; Hammer, Struggle, pp. 45-53.

<sup>6</sup>Fall, Two Viet-Nams, pp. 61-63.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., pp. 71-78.

<sup>8</sup>Quoted in Hammer, Struggle, p. 105.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., pp. 116, 129.

<sup>10</sup>Vo Nguyen Giap, People's War, People's Army (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. xxix-xxxix.

<sup>11</sup>Gen. Boyer de la Tour, Le Martyre de l'Armée Française (Paris: Les Presses du Mail, 1963), p. 47.

<sup>12</sup>George K. Tanham, Communist Revolutionary Warfare: the Viet-Minh in Indochina (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp. 68-69.

<sup>13</sup>Fall, Two Viet-Nams, pp. 106-107.

<sup>14</sup>Fall in Street Without Joy has pointed out that at least one major FUF offensive in North Viet-Nam, designed to crush the whole headquarters of the rebellion, fell short of its objective due to the last-minute diversion of French troops to crush an uprising in Madagascar. Today it is an interesting speculation as to whether the Malagasy affair did not in fact save the Viet Minh.

<sup>15</sup>Fall, Two Viet-Nams, p. 115.

<sup>16</sup>Hammer, Struggle, p. 285.

<sup>17</sup>Cf. Gen. Jean Marchand, L'Indochine en Guerre (Paris: Pouzet, 1954).

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

<sup>19</sup>Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counter-Insurgency Warfare (New York: Praeger, 1964).

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Good sources on the subject can be found in Jacques Mordal, Marine Indochine (Paris: Amiot-Dumont, 1953); Jean Mauclère, Marins dans les Arroyos (Paris: Peyronnet, 1949); Cdr. Brossard, Dinassaut (Paris: France-Empire, 1952).

<sup>22</sup>Fall, Two Viet-Nams, pp. 212-216.

<sup>23</sup>Jean Laproux, "30,000 Cambodgiens échappent à l'emprise des rebelles," Indochine-Sudest Asiatique (Saigon), (January 1953), 23-28.

<sup>24</sup>Navarre, quoted in Fall, Two Viet-Nams, p. 127.

<sup>25</sup>Fall, Street, pp. 186ff.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., pp. 312-329; The Washington Post (November 5, 1964), p. A 26.

<sup>27</sup>See Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway and H.H. Martin, Soldier: Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956) and Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1963).

<sup>28</sup>Fall, Two Viet-Nams, pp. 337-384.

<sup>29</sup>For a French appraisal, see Gen. Paul Ely, L'Indochine dans la Tourmente (Paris: Plon, 1964).

<sup>30</sup>Fall, Street, p. 296.

<sup>31</sup>W.W. Rostow, "Guerrilla Warfare in Underdeveloped Areas," Marine Corps Gazette (January 1962), p. 49: ". . .As you know, it takes somewhere between 10 and 20 soldiers to control 1 guerrilla in an organized operation. . . ."

<sup>32</sup>Bernard Fall, "Trials and Tribulations of a Party Line: The French Communist Party and the Indochina War," Foreign Affairs (April 1955).

<sup>33</sup>See Bidault-Daladier exchange of March 9, 1954, in Journal officiel Debates Parlementaires (March 10, 1954), p. 768.

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